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(see note 1 above).
[7] For a full list with references, see the Conclusion.
[8] Thuc. 1. 35.3; discussed in 5.3C below. Note the interesting remark by H. B. Leech, "Ancient
International Law," Contemp. Rev . 43 (1883): 264, that the Corcyraeans "commented on the injustice
caused by the absence of a Foreign Enlistment Act at Athens, and criticized severely that benevolent
neutrality which failed to find a footing in modern International Law." For the existence in the classical
period of such legislation, however, see 8.4.B below and 9.3.B note 38 (quoting Aen. Tac. 10. 7).
[9] Thuc. 2. 72.1 (dechesthe amphoterous philous ); discussed in 6.4 below. At their trial the
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Plataeans claimed, despite everything, that they had maintained philia toward Sparta (3. 58.2 and 4)
and fought on the Athenian side only from compulsion (kat' ananken 58.2).
[10] This really was the situation for Plataea; but unfortunately for the Plataeans, the Athenians
insisted that neutrality be rejected even though they themselves were in no position to provide
support for Plataea. The behavior of the West Greek states from 431 suggests they knew exactly what
was expected of neutral status, and the indirect response of Athens also suggests that the Athenians
hesitated to attack shipping directly when unprovoked. Similar expectations and resulting demands
between supposedly uninvolved and actively belligerent parties underlie the give-and-take of
diplomacy between the Greeks and Persians during the fourth century (see 9.3.B below).
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The existence of neutral states complicated diplomacy and was a challenge to the authoritarian aims of
the hegemonial powers. Clearly, weak states were always vulnerable to violation of their attempts to
remain neutral, particularly when a powerful belligerent was strongly opposed to the policy. The fate of
Melos makes this perfectly clear, as do the fate of Belgium in 1914 and the failure of numerous other
"legal" attempts at neutral policy. No appeal to the legitimacy or the justice of the Melians' position, or
even to the Athenians' self-interest, could prevail against Athens' refusal to accept and respect Melian
neutrality.[11] It should be understood, however, that there is consistent evidence that throughout the
classical period some instances of neutrality were admitted without regard to the absolute power of
the state desiring to be neutral but in recognition that such a policy should (and could) be safely
accepted by the belligerents. Fourth-century Megara is perhaps the best example of this phenomenon,
but by the 360s a number of other states found ways to negotiate effective neutrality in the continued
conflicts of that turbulent period.[12] The policy appears to have been more widespread during the
struggle between Philip II and the Athenian alliance than has been recognized, despite Demosthenes'
bitter condemnation of neutrals.[13]
But why do we find such an inconsistent mixture of acceptance of and resistance to the idea of
abstention being legitimate? Certainly the right of a state to remain aloof from the conflicts of other
states and to demand respect for that position is fundamental to achievement of at least limitation of,
if not control over the
[11] See 7.1 below.
[12] See 8.3.C below (Megara) and 9.2.C (other states); cf. Salmon, Wealthy Corinth , 380-81: "The
implication of the arrangements was that small states might remain neutral in the quarrels between
me great powers. This was a principle which, if it could not eradicate the larger power struggles, at
least might have helped restrict their effects to those states which insisted on taking part in them. The
principle is well summarized by Xenophon (Hell . 7.4.7): 'so that they might make the peace with
those who wanted it, and let those who wished. to make war do so.'"
[13] See 9.5 below.
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chaos of unrestricted warfare. Since the right to neutrality could potentially benefit belligerents as
much as nonbelligerents, why do we find such consistent hostility, whether it is in the actions of the
states themselves or in the attitude of the sources? The answer, I believe, lies in the structure of
archaic and classical Greek political thought. Basic to Greek culture was a competitive spirit that
influenced every aspect of life, including interstate relations.[14] For this very reason, the evolution of
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